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unregulated, or regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Gradstein (1995),
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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to answer whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should
be left unregulated, or optimally regulated, or first monopolized and then optimally
regulated. While this question is novel, the regulatory design problem when the regulator
has incomplete information about the regulated industry has been extensively studied in
the economics of regulation since the seminal work of Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982).
The wisdom of BM, who dealt with the problem of regulating a natural monopoly with
unknown costs, was simply to use the Revelation Principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin, 1979; Myerson, 1979; Harris and Townsend, 1981), by which they could restrict
themselves to incentive-compatible revelation mechanisms, requiring the monopolistic
firm to report its unknown cost information and ensuring that it has no incentive for
misreporting. This approach allows one to directly calculate the informational rents that
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should be provided to the regulated firm as a reward for truthful revelation. By deriving
the minimal subsidy that will generate these rents to the firm, one can also calculate the
net gains of the producer and consumers. Aggregating these net gains by a (generalized)
social welfare function, the objective of the regulator was reduced by BM to finding a
quantity schedule (a function of cost reports), among several other schedules, that can
maximize the expected value of the social welfare with respect to the regulator’s beliefs
about the private cost information of the regulated firm.
Many extensions of the BM’s problem -to deal with regulating a monopolistic industry
under various types of asymmetric information- were later studied by Sappington (1983),
Baron and Besanko (1984), Riordian (1984), Rochet (1984), Laffont and Tirole (1986),
and Lewis and Sappington (1988), among many others. A common feature of all these
studies is that the optimal regulatory mechanism must offer to the regulated monopoly
some information rents, which create a deadweight loss in welfare unless the social welfare
function treats the producer and the consumer welfare equally. A remarkable work of
Gradstein (1995) extended the regulatory mechanism design to the case of an oligopoly
with asymmetric cost information and showed that the information rents that should
be offered to the oligopolistic firms can be balanced to be zero. This exciting result
implies that the marginal cost pricing can always be freely implemented irrespective of
the definition of the social welfare. However, since these rents cannot be individually
rational for some of the regulated firms, it is questionable whether a regulatory authority
could force the oligopolistic firms to participate in the regulatory program proposed by
Gradstein (1995).
As a partial remedy to the said problem, the transfers proposed by Gradstein (1995)
can be balanced to be equal to the aggregate fixed costs of the oligopolistic industry,
as we will propose in Section 2.2. This modification may ensure that the Gradstein’s
(1995) regulatory mechanism would satisfy an industry-wide rationality (or participa-
tion) constraint. Although such a modification is likely to increase the applicability of
the Gradstein’s (1995) optimal regulation program, it is not clear whether the outcome
of that program would be welfare superior to the equilibrium outcome of an unregulated
Cournot oligopoly. Definitely, consumers would benefit under the optimal regulation pro-
gram from the increased output implied by the marginal cost pricing; but, they would
also be hurt by the subsidies they need to pay for financing the fixed costs of the regulated
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firms. This tradeoff, and consequently the ambiguity as to the desirability of oligopoly
regulation, can in fact be felt by the whole society under a social welfare function where
the welfare of producers has, in general, a lower weight than the welfare of consumers.
Moreover, it is also ambiguous, in general, whether regulating an oligopoly according to
the Gradstein’s (1995) optimal regulation program would be more desirable -in terms
of the induced social welfare- than simply monopolizing the oligopoly and regulating it
afterwards according to the BM’s (1982) optimal mechanism. This second ambiguity is
simply caused by the following tradeoff faced by consumers: On the one hand, the regu-
lated monopolization can be unattractive for consumers since the information rents that
should be offered to the regulated monopoly as part of the incentive program can be very
huge relative to the gross consumer surplus, unlike the informational rents in the case
of oligopoly regulation which can be as low as the aggregate fixed costs of the industry.
But, on the other hand, the regulated monopolization of an oligopolistic industry with
N firms would also free consumers from the obligation to finance the fixed costs of N −1
firms who are not allowed to operate; hence the tradeoff. Calculating these two tradeoffs
with the help of a formal model and investigating how they would be affected by the
relevant parameters of the model, we aim to answer whether/when a Cournot oligopoly
should be optimally regulated or first monopolized and afterwards optimally regulated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 presents our results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an oligopolistic market involving N ≥ 2 symmetric firms with unknown
costs. Firms are indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Firm i faces the cost function
Ci(qi, θ) =
 K + θqi if qi > 0,0 if qi = 0, (1)
where K is the known fixed cost and θ is the marginal cost, which are the same for all
firms. It is assumed that θ lies in a known interval Θ = [θ0, θ1], where θ1 > θ0 ≥ 0. The
total production in the market is denoted by Q, so Q =
∑
i qi. The market faces an
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inverse demand function which is given by
P (Q) =
 a−Q if 0 ≤ Q ≤ a,0 if Q > a, (2)
where a > θ1 is a known constant. The gross value to consumers of a total quantity Q
is denoted by V (Q) where
V (Q) =
∫ Q
0
P (Q˜)dQ˜. (3)
Then, the consumer surplus becomes V (Q)− P (Q)Q.
Everything about the described market other than θ is known to the regulator as
well as to the firms, while θ is only known to the firms. However, the regulator has
(commonly known) prior beliefs about θ, represented by the probability density function
f(.), which is positive and continuous over Θ. Finally, F (.) denotes the corresponding
cumulative distribution function.
2.1 Unregulated Cournot Oligopoly
Here, we consider that the firms in the described oligopolistic industry compete a` la
Cournot (in quantities). Let pii(qi, q−i; θ) denote the operational profits of firm i with
the marginal cost θ when it produces qi units of output while the quantity decisions of
other firms are given by the list q−i = (q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+1, . . . , qN). Let q = (qi, q−i) be the
quantity profile for the given industry. Then,
pii(q; θ) = P (Q)qi − θqi −K, (4)
using Q =
∑
i qi. We say that the quantity profile q
∗ is a Cournot (Nash) equilibrium if
for all i it is true that
pii(q
∗
i , q
∗
−i; θ) ≥ pii(qi, q∗−i; θ) for all qi ≥ 0. (5)
Proposition 1. When the oligopolistic firms’ marginal cost is θ, the Cournot (Nash)
equilibrium is given by the quantity profile q∗(θ) that satisfies
q∗i (θ) =
a− θ
N + 1
for all i. (6)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (6) implies that at the Cournot (Nash) equilibrium, the total quantity of
output is Q∗(θ) =
∑
i q
∗
i (θ) = (a − θ)N/(N + 1), whereas the price is P (Q∗(θ)) =
a− (a− θ)N/(N + 1). The equilibrium profits of firm i would then become
piCi (q
∗(θ); θ) =
(a− θ)2
(N + 1)2
−K. (7)
(The superscript C points to the unregulated Cournot oligopoly.) Correspondingly, the
equilibrium profits for the industry, i.e., the producer welfare, would be
piC(θ,K,N) ≡
∑
i
piCi (q
∗(θ); θ) =
(a− θ)2N
(N + 1)2
−NK. (8)
On the other side, the equilibrium welfare of consumers is given by
CWC(θ,N) ≡ V (Q∗(θ))− P (Q∗(θ))Q∗(θ) = [Q
∗(θ)]2
2
=
(a− θ)2N2
2(N + 1)2
. (9)
Finally, we denote by SWC(θ, α,N) the equilibrium social welfare at the marginal cost
level θ, which is the sum of CWC(θ,N) and α fraction of piC(θ,K,N), with α ∈ [0, 1].
Formally,
SWC(θ, α,K,N) ≡ CWC(θ,N) + αpiC(θ,K,N)
=
(a− θ)2N2
2(N + 1)2
+ α
(a− θ)2N
(N + 1)2
− αNK
=
(a− θ)2
2
N2 + 2αN
(N + 1)2
− αNK. (10)
2.2 Regulated Oligopoly
Here, we will consider the optimal regulation of the oligopolistic industry described at the
beginning of this section. To this end, we will focus on the optimal mechanism proposed
by Gradstein (1995). This mechanism consists of transfer functions Ti : [0, a] → <, i =
1, . . . , N , where Ti(q) is the transfer received by firm i under the quantity profile q. Then,
the net gain of firm i when regulated according to this mechanism will be the sum of its
operational profits and the transfer it receives. Let piGi (q; θ) denote the net gain of firm i
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with the marginal cost θ when the output profile is q. (The superscript G points to the
regulation of the oligopoly according to Gradstein’s (1995) mechanism.) Then,
piGi (q; θ) = P (Q)qi − θqi −K + Ti(q), (11)
using Q =
∑
i qi. Resultingly, the industry welfare at the quantity profile q would be
piG(q; θ) =
∑
i
piGi (q; θ) = P (Q)Q− θQ−NK +
∑
i
Ti(q). (12)
On the other side, the welfare of consumers under the given mechanism would be
CWG(q; θ) = V (Q)− P (Q)Q−
∑
i
Ti(q). (13)
Finally, we denote by SWG(q; θ) the social welfare at the marginal cost level θ, which is
the sum of CWG(q; θ) and α fraction of piG(q; θ), with α ∈ [0, 1]. Formally,
SWG(q; θ) = CWG(q; θ) + αpiG(q; θ),
= V (Q)− P (Q)Q−
∑
i
Ti(q) + α
(
P (Q)Q− θQ−NK +
∑
i
Ti(q)
)
,
= V (Q)− θQ− (1− α)
(
P (Q)Q− θQ+
∑
i
Ti(q)
)
− αNK. (14)
The mechanism (Ti)
N
i=1 satisfies the participation constraint for the oligopoly if
piG(q; θ) ≥ 0, (15)
for all θ ∈ Θ and for all feasible profiles q. On the other hand, a mechanism (Ti)Ni=1
and a quantity profile qS(θ) maximize the social welfare SWG(q; θ) only if the price is
always equal to the marginal cost, i.e., P (QS(θ)) = θ, where QS(θ) =
∑
i=1 q
S
i (θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ. Clearly, qSi (θ) = (a − θ)/N and QS(θ) = a − θ for all θ ∈ Θ. It then follows
from (12) and P (QS(θ)) = θ that the socially optimal quantity profile qS(θ) satisfies
the participation constraint (15) if
∑
i Ti(q
S(θ)) ≥ NK. Since maximizing SWG(q; θ) in
(14) requires minimizing
∑
i Ti(q(θ)), we must have
∑
i Ti(q
S(θ)) = NK.
Because the marginal cost is only known to the firms, the regulator cannot directly
enforce the socially optimal outcome at the given marginal cost. However, the regulator
can implement this outcome by allowing the oligopolistic firms to play a Cournot game
under a suitable chosen transfer mechanism (Ti)
N
i . In that game, firm i would maximize
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piGi (q; θ) given by (11). Let q
∗(θ) denote the Cournot (Nash) equilibrium profile for that
game. Then, for all i it must be true that
piGi (q
∗
i (θ), q
∗
−i(θ); θ) ≥ piGi (qi, q∗−i(θ); θ) for all qi ≥ 0. (16)
A mechanism (Ti)
N
i is said to Nash implement the socially optimal outcome for the de-
scribed oligopolistic industry if q∗(θ) = qS(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. This mechanism also satisfies
the participation constraint (15) if
∑
i Ti(q
∗(θ)) = NK for all θ ∈ Θ. Using these defi-
nitions, we obtain the following result as a corollary to Proposition 1 of Gradstein (1995).
Proposition 2. There exists a (transfer) mechanism that Nash implements the socially
optimal outcome for the described oligopolistic industry and also satisfies the participa-
tion constraint (15).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that at the socially optimal outcome, the social welfare reduces to
SWG(θ, α,K,N) ≡ SWG(qS(θ); θ) = V
(∑
i
qSi (θ)
)
− θ
∑
i
qSi (θ)−NK,
=
[
∑
i q
S
i (θ)]
2
2
−NK,
=
(a− θ)2
2
−NK. (17)
In the original mechanism of Gradstein (1995), the transfers are required to be balanced,
i.e.,
∑
i Ti(q) = 0 for all feasible profiles q, implying that the participation constraint
for the oligopolistic firms are not taken into consideration. On the other hand, in our
modified mechanism, the participation constraint can be satisfied at the industry level,
i.e.,
∑
i pi
G
i (q, θ) = 0, implying that some individual firms may obtain negative gains at
the implemented social outcome while some others would obtain positive gains. In other
words, it is not possible to ensure piGi (q; θ) ≥ 0 for each i (at all θ and q). Definitely, this
is a serious weakness, casting doubts on the applicability of the presented implementation
mechanism, i.e., the desirability of the oligopoly regulation, irrespective of the induced
social welfare.
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2.3 Regulated Monopoly
Here, we consider that the oligopolistic industry is monopolized, with the regulator select-
ing one of the N symmetric firms (henceforth the monopolistic firm) as the sole producer.
The monopolized market will then be subject to quantity and price regulation according
to the direct-revelation mechanism proposed by BM (1982). This mechanism involves
four functions (r, p, q, s) of the cost parameter. After the mechanism is announced, the
monopolistic firm is asked to submit a cost report from the set Θ. If its report is θˆ, r(θˆ)
is the probability that the monopolistic firm is allowed to produce, p(θˆ) and q(θˆ) are
the price and quantity of the good respectively, and s(θˆ) is the subsidy received by the
monopolistic firm. In that case, the welfare of the regulated firm would become
pi(θˆ, θ) =
[
p(θˆ)q(θˆ)− C(q(θˆ), θ)
]
r(θˆ) + s(θˆ). (18)
A regulatory policy (r, p, q, s) is called by BM as feasible if it satisfies (21)-(24) for all
θ ∈ Θ:
(i) 0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ 1 (19)
(ii) p(θ) = P (q(θ)) (20)
(iii) pi(θ, θ) ≥ pi(θˆ, θ), for all θˆ ∈ Θ (incentive-compatibility) (21)
(iv) pi(θ, θ) ≥ 0 (individual-rationality) (22)
Given a feasible regulatory policy (r, p, q, s) and any cost θ ∈ Θ, the consumer and the
producer welfare would respectively become
CW (θ) = [V (q(θ))− p(θ)q(θ)] r(θ)− s(θ), (23)
pi(θ) ≡ pi(θ, θ) = [p(θ)q(θ)− C(q(θ), θ)] r(θ) + s(θ). (24)
The social welfare SW (θ, α) is the sum of the consumer welfare and α fraction of the
producer welfare, with α ∈ [0, 1]. So,
SW (θ, α) =CW (θ) + αpi(θ) = [V (q(θ))− C(q(θ), θ))] r(θ)− (1− α) pi(θ). (25)
The regulator aims to choose a feasible mechanism (r, p, q, s) to
maximize
∫
θ∈Θ
SW (θ, α)f(θ)dθ subject to (19)− (22). (26)
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Before presenting the optimal regulatory policy of BM, we introduce the following as-
sumption. (This assumption, which simplifies the optimal regulatory policy and conse-
quently our results in Section 3, was not needed by BM in their characterization result.)
Assumption 1. F (θ)/f(θ) is nondecreasing on Θ.
The following result is a direct corollary to Proposition 1 of BM (1982).
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the solution to the problem in (26) is
(r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯) satisfying equations (27)-(30) for all θ ∈ Θ:
p¯(θ) = θ + (1− α)F (θ)
f(θ)
(27)
P (q¯(θ)) = p¯(θ) (28)
r¯(θ) =
 1 if V (q¯(θ))− p¯(θ)q¯(θ) ≥ K0 otherwise (29)
s¯(θ) = [K + θq¯(θ)− p¯(θ)q¯(θ)] r¯(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(θ˜)q¯(θ˜)dθ˜ (30)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given (27)-(30), we can calculate the producer welfare, consumer welfare, and the
social welfare as
piBM(θ, α,K) =
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(θ˜)q¯(θ˜)dθ˜ =
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(θ˜)
(
a− θ˜ − (1− α)F (θ˜)
f(θ˜)
)
dθ˜, (31)
CWBM(θ, α,K) = [V (q¯(θ))−K − θq¯(θ)]r¯(θ)− piBM(θ)
=
(a− θ)q¯(θ)r¯(θ)
2
−Kr¯(θ)− piBM(θ), (32)
SWBM(θ, α,K) = [V (q¯(θ))−K − θq¯(θ)]r¯(θ)− (1− α) piBM(θ)
=
(a− θ)q¯(θ)
2
r¯(θ)−Kr¯(θ)− (1− α) piBM(θ), (33)
respectively. (Here, the superscript BM points to the regulation of the monopoly ac-
cording to the BM mechanism.)
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3 Results
For some of our results, we will the need the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The demand parameter a satisfies
a >
√
2K + θ1 +
1− α
f(θ1)
. (34)
When α = 1 and K = 0, Assumption 2 reduces to a > θ1, which was already assumed
in the description of the inverse demand curve in Section 2. Assumption 2, along with
Assumption 1, will yield the following corollary (to Proposition 3), ensuring that the
monopolistic firm will always be allowed to operate under the BM mechanism.
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the optimal mechanism in (27)-(30)
implies r¯(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The below result shows that when the production requires fixed costs, one can always
find a social welfare function with a sufficiently high weight for the producer welfare un-
der which the regulation of the monopoly becomes, for the society, always superior to the
regulated oligopoly, while the latter would become superior to the unregulated oligopoly.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for all K > 0 and integers
N ≥ 2, there exists α¯(K,N) ∈ [0, 1) such that for all α ∈ [α¯(K,N), 1], we have
SWBM(θ, α,K) > SWG(θ, α,K,N) > SWC(θ, α,K,N) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above proposition partially changes when the fixed cost of production is zero.
In that case, the highest social welfare can always be attained not only by the regulated
monopolization of the oligopoly but also by the regulation of the oligopoly itself.
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Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for all integers N ≥ 2, there
exists α¯(N) ∈ [0, 1) such that for all α ∈ [α¯(N), 1], we have
SWBM(θ, α, 0) = SWG(θ, α, 0, N) > SWC(θ, α, 0, N) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Propositions 4 and 5, both of which are valid when α is sufficiently close to 1, are silent
for an arbitrary value of α ∈ [0, 1). However, we are able to show that for oligopolies with
sufficiently high number of firms, a regulated monopoly is always socially more desirable
than the regulated or unregulated oligopoly for any α ∈ [0, 1), provided that there are
fixed costs of production.
Proposition 6. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, for all α ∈ [0, 1) and K > 0, there
exists an integer N¯(α,K) ≥ 2 such that for all integers N ≥ N¯(α,K), we have
SWBM(θ, α,K) > SWC(θ, α,K,N) > SWG(θ, α,K,N) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
One should note in the above proposition that the regulated oligopoly is not only
inferior to the regulated monopoly but also to the unregulated oligopoly when the num-
ber of oligopolistic firms is sufficiently high. This is simply because of the participation
constraint that requires consumers to finance the total fixed costs, NK, in the case
of regulation. Since the weight of the consumer welfare is “one” in the social welfare
function, the contribution of the total fixed costs to the social welfare becomes equal to
−NK in the case of a regulated oligopoly. On the other hand, the said contribution be-
comes −αNK in the case of an unregulated oligopoly, since the fixed costs are incurred
by the oligopolistic firms and their welfare weight is α. The difference of these two
terms, −(1− α)NK, is always negative (unless α = 1 or K = 0), making the regulated
oligopoly inferior to the unregulated oligopoly for sufficiently high values of N . It follows
that when α is different from 1 and when fixed costs are present in the production, the
regulator should leave the oligopoly unregulated, unless, of course, her policy choices
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involve the regulated monopolization of the oligopoly, which happens to be the first-best
policy option. As shown by the next result, Proposition 6 is no longer valid when there
are restrictions on the size of the fixed costs.
Proposition 7. Let Assumption 1 hold and consider any α ∈ [0, 1). Then, (i) for all
N ≥ 2 there exists K(α,N) > 0 such that SWG(θ, α,K,N) > SWC(θ, α,K,N) for all
K ∈ [0, K(α,N)] and θ ∈ Θ, and (ii) there exist K(α) > 0 and integer N(α) ≥ 2 such
that SWC(θ, α,K,N) > SWBM(θ, α,K) for all K ∈ [0, K(α)], integers N ≥ N(α), and
θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that in situations where the fixed costs of production are suf-
ficiently small, regulating an oligopoly is always superior to not regulating it from the
viewpoint of the society. Additionally, if in these situations the number of firms is suffi-
ciently large, even the unregulated oligopoly becomes socially superior to the regulated
monopoly.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should
be left unregulated, or optimally regulated, or first monopolized and then optimally
regulated. For the given oligopolistic industry, we have first characterized the Cournot
(Nash) equilibrium allocation of the quantity competition game (Proposition 1). Next
we have presented the equilibrium allocation when the oligopoly is optimally regulated
(Proposition 2) according to the mechanism of Gradstein (1995). As the final component
of our model, we have also considered the situation when one of the oligopolistic firms
is granted the monopoly right and optimally regulated (Proposition 3) according to
the mechanism of BM (1982). Calculating the actual social welfare in each of these
three cases, we have been able to show that when there are fixed costs in production
and also the weight of the producer welfare in the social welfare function, i.e., the α
parameter, takes a sufficiently high value in the unit interval, the realized social welfare
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is always higher for the optimally regulated monopoly than for the regulated oligopoly,
while regulating the oligopoly becomes socially more desirable than not regulating it
(Proposition 4). This result slightly changes when fixed costs are absent in production.
In that case, the highest social welfare can always be attained not only with an optimally
regulated monopoly but also with an optimally regulated oligopoly (Proposition 5).
Next, we have considered oligopolies with large number of firms (or simply large
oligopolies), allowing us to make welfare comparisons for values of α not very close to
one. We have showed that for any α less than one, there always exists a sufficiently large
oligopoly such that the outcome obtained from the optimally regulated monopolization of
this oligopoly is always (socially) welfare superior to the unregulated (Cournot) outcome,
which, on the other hand, is always welfare superior to the regulated outcome of the
same oligopoly (Proposition 6). However, this result dramatically changes if there are
size restrictions on the fixed costs. For situations where the fixed costs of production are
sufficiently small, we find that optimally regulating a Cournot oligopoly is always superior
to not regulating it from the viewpoint of the society (Proposition 7(i)). Additionally, if
in these situations the number of firms is sufficiently large, even the unregulated oligopoly
may become socially superior to the optimally regulated monopoly (Proposition 7(ii)).
To conclude, this study has revealed that whether and how to regulate an oligopolistic
industry cannot be answered independently of the number of the oligopolistic firms
and the size of their fixed costs, and the definition of the social welfare function, i.e.,
the relative weight of the producer welfare. The sum of information rents an optimal
regulatory mechanism should offer to the regulated firms can be as low as the total fixed
costs of production in the case of an oligopoly, rendering a regulated oligopoly socially
more desirable than a regulated monopoly provided that these fixed costs are sufficiently
small. Oppositely, in cases where the production processes require large fixed costs, the
regulated monopolization of an oligopoly becomes socially superior to the regulation of
the oligopoly if the social welfare function does not treat producers and consumers very
asymmetrically or if the number of oligopolistic firms is sufficiently large.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The problem of firm i, given that the rest of the firms choose
quantities in q−i, is given by
max
qi≥0
pii(qi, q−i; θ) = max
qi≥0
P (Q)qi − θqi −K. (35)
The first-order condition for (35) is given by
qi =
a− θ −∑j 6=i qj
2
. (36)
The symmetry of the firms implies qj = qi for all j 6= i, further implying
∑
j 6=i qj =
(N − 1)qi. Inserting this into (36) yields (6). The second-order condition for maximiza-
tion is satisfied since ∂pii(qi, q−i; θ)/∂qi = −2 at all (qi, q−i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. In our model the inverse demand function is a polynomial
of degree 1 and N is assumed to be at least 2. Proposition 1 of Gradstein (1995, p. 324)
shows that if the inverse demand function is a polynomial of at most (N − 1)th degree,
then socially optimal outcome can be Nash implemented by a mechanism Ti : [0, a] →
<, i = 1, . . . , N such that ∑i Ti(q) = 0 for all feasible profiles q. Let (Ti)Ni be such a
mechanism, and consider the modified mechanism T ∗i : [0, a]→ <, i = 1, . . . , N such that
T ∗i (q) = K+Ti(q) for all feasible profiles q. It is clear that the modified mechanism Nash
implements the socially optimal outcome and also satisfies the participation constraint
(15). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Due to Assumption 1, p¯(θ) is nondecreasing in θ and there-
fore q¯(θ) and r¯(θ) are nonincreasing in θ. Thus, the proposition is a direct corollary to
Proposition 1 of BM (1982, pp. 920-921). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Note that Assumption 2 can be rewritten as a >
√
2K + θ1 +
(1 − α)F (θ1)/f(θ1), since F (θ1) = 1. Then Assumptions 1 and 2 together would imply
that for all θ ∈ Θ we have a > √2K + θ + (1 − α)F (θ)/f(θ) = √2K + p¯(θ), further
implying q¯(θ) = a − p¯(θ) > √2K or q¯(θ)2/2 > K. Since V (q¯(θ)) − p¯(θ)q¯(θ) = q¯(θ)2/2,
equation (29) implies that r¯(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Since Assumption 1 holds, the optimal mechanism regu-
lating a monopoly is given by (27)-(30). Now let α = 1 and consider any K > 0, θ ∈ Θ
and integer N ≥ 2. Equation (10) implies
SWC(θ, 1, K,N) =
(a− θ)2
2
(N2 + 2N)
(N + 1)2
−NK, (37)
whereas equation (17) implies
SWG(θ, 1, K,N) =
(a− θ)2
2
−NK. (38)
On the other hand, it follows from equation (33) that
SWBM(θ, 1, K) =
(a− θ)2
2
−K, (39)
since α = 1 implies q¯(θ) = a − θ and Corollary 1 implies (thanks to Assumptions 1
and 2) r¯(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Apparently, SWBM(θ, 1, K) > SWG(θ, 1, K,N) >
SWC(θ, 1, K,N). Since SWBM(θ, α,K), SWG(θ, α,K,N), and SWC(θ, α,K,N) are all
continuous w.r.t. α, there exists α¯(K,N) ∈ [0, 1) such that for all α ∈ [α¯(K,N), 1], we
have SWBM(θ, α,K) > SWG(θ, α,K,N) > SWC(θ, α,K,N) for all θ ∈ Θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since Assumption 1 holds, the optimal mechanism regu-
lating a monopoly is given by (27)-(30). Let K = 0, and pick any θ ∈ Θ and integer
N ≥ 2. Also let α = 1. Equation (10) implies
SWC(θ, 1, 0, N) =
(a− θ)2
2
(N2 + 2N)
(N + 1)2
, (40)
whereas equation (17) implies
SWG(θ, 1, 0, N) =
(a− θ)2
2
. (41)
On the other hand, it follows from equation (33) that
SWBM(θ, 1, 0) =
(a− θ)2
2
, (42)
since α = 1 implies q¯(θ) = a−θ and Corollary 1 implies (thanks to Assumptions 1 and 2)
r¯(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Apparently, SWBM(θ, 1, 0) = SWG(θ, 1, 0, N) > SWC(θ, 1, 0, N).
Since SWBM(θ, α, 0), SWG(θ, α, 0, N), and SWC(θ, α, 0, N) are all continuous w.r.t. α,
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there exists α¯(N) ∈ [0, 1) such that for all α ∈ [α¯(N), 1], we have SWBM(θ, α, 0) =
SWG(θ, α, 0, N) > SWC(θ, α, 0, N) for all θ ∈ Θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since Assumption 1 holds, the optimal mechanism regu-
lating a monopoly is given by (27)-(30). Now, pick any α ∈ [0, 1) and K > 0. Equation
(10) implies
lim
N→∞
SWC(θ, α,K,N) = lim
N→∞
(a− θ)2
2
(N2 + 2αN)
(N + 1)2
− αNK = −∞. (43)
On the other hand, SWBM(θ, α,K) is always finite. Thus, there exists an integer
N¯1(α,K) ≥ 2 such that for all integers N ≥ N¯1(α,K), we have SWBM(θ, α,K) >
SWC(θ, α,K,N) for all θ ∈ Θ. Also note that subtracting (10) from (17) yields
SWG(θ, α,K,N)−SWC(θ, α,K,N) = (a− θ)
2
2
[1 + 2(1− α)N ]
(N + 1)2
− (1−α)NK. (44)
It follows that
lim
N→∞
[
SWG(θ, α,K,N)− SWC(θ, α,K,N)] = −∞, (45)
implying that there exists an integer N¯2(α,K) ≥ 2 such that for all integers N ≥
N¯2(α,K), we have SW
C(θ, α,K,N) > SWG(θ, α,K,N) for all θ ∈ Θ. Let N(α,K) =
max{N¯1(α,K), N¯2(α,K)}. So, SWBM(θ, α,K) > SWC(θ, α,K,N) > SWG(θ, α,K,N)
for all θ ∈ Θ if N ≥ N¯(α,K). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider any α ∈ [0, 1).
Part (i): Inserting K = 0 into (10) and (17), we obtain
SWC(θ, α, 0, N) =
(a− θ)2
2
N2 + 2αN
(N + 1)2
, (46)
and
SWG(θ, α, 0, N) =
(a− θ)2
2
, (47)
respectively. Evidently, SWG(θ, α, 0, N) > SWC(θ, α, 0, N) for all integers N ≥ 2 and
θ ∈ Θ. Since SWC(θ, α,K,N) and SWG(θ, α,K,N) are continuous w.r.t. K, we
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conclude that for all N ≥ 2 there exists K(α,N) > 0 such that SWG(θ, α,K,N) >
SWC(θ, α,K,N) for all K ∈ [0, K(α,N)] and θ ∈ Θ.
Part (ii): Since Assumption 1 holds, the optimal mechanism regulating a monopoly is
given by (27)-(30). We insert K = 0 to (33) to get
SWBM(θ, α, 0) =
(a− θ)q¯(θ)
2
− (1− α) piBM(θ), (48)
since K = 0 implies r¯(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Note also that
lim
N→∞
SWC(θ, α, 0, N) =
(a− θ)2
2
, (49)
which is higher than SWBM(θ, α, 0), for all θ ∈ Θ and α ∈ [0, 1), since q¯(θ0) = a − θ0
and q¯(θ) < a− θ for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1], and piBM(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1) and piBM(θ1) = 0.
Therefore, there exists an integer N¯(α) ≥ 2 such that for all integers N ≥ N¯(α), we
have limN→∞ SWC(θ, α, 0, N) > SWBM(θ, α, 0) for all θ ∈ Θ. Because SWC(θ, α,K,N)
and SWBM(θ, α,K,N) are continuous w.r.t. K, there exist K(α) > 0 and an integer
N(α) ≥ 2 such that SWC(θ, α,K,N) > SWBM(θ, α,K) for all K ∈ [0, K(α)], integers
N ≥ N(α), and θ ∈ Θ. Q.E.D.
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